It is too early to say that the US strategy against the Islamic State is imploding, but it is scarcely too soon to question whether this is possible.

In fact, it is far from clear that the original US strategy ever planned to deal with the complications that have arisen since President Obama officially announced a portion of what that strategy really had to be.

The Non-Strategy for Dealing with the Islamic State

To begin with, the basic goal of degrading and destroying the Islamic State always bordered on the ridiculous.

It was always clear that some form of violent Islamic extremism would survive any combination of US air attacks, Iraqi efforts to clear jihadists on the ground, and the limited capabilities of the Free Syrian Army. In fact, senior US defense officials and military officers have repeatedly made this clear by limiting the objective to “degrade” and noting that the struggle against violent religious extremism would go on for years if not more than a decade.

US counterterrorism data make the broader nature of this struggle all too clear even if the fact the United States is working with its regional allies to deal with other extremism movements in virtually every country with a large Muslim population did not. Like the worst moments in the Christian Reformation and Counterreformation, this is a struggle that goes far beyond one country or one movement.

The database for the most recent US State Department Country Reports on Terrorism shows an increase from less than 300 major terrorist incidents a year in the Middle East and North Africa during 1998 to 2004 to 1,600 in 2008, then from 1,500 in 2010 to 1,700 in 2011, 2,500 in 2012, and 4,650 in 2013 – a fifteen fold increase since 2002, and threefold increase since 2010. Yet, bad as these figures were, the worst cases of terrorism were outside the region and in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

A recent RAND study found a 58-percent increase in the number of Salafi-jihadist groups from 2010 to 2013, and that the number of Salafi jihadists more than doubled from 2010 to 2013, according to both its low and high estimates. Moreover, for all the US and other Western fears of terrorism, RAND found that, “Approximately 99 percent of the attacks by al Qaeda and its affiliates in 2013 were against “near enemy:” largely other Muslims in the Middle East and North Africa.

No one should ignore the fact that the Islamic State is a key threat.

RAND did find a significant increase in attacks by al Qaeda–affiliated groups between 2007 and 2013, although the most the violence in 2013 was perpetrated by the Islamic State (43 percent), which eventually left al Qaeda.

But, the other leading groups were affiliated with al-Qaeda and were al Shabaab (25 percent); Jabhat al-Nusrah (21 percent); and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (10 percent).

It is also critical to point out that even if the Islamic state does not survive as an entity in both Syria and Iraq, intelligence estimates by one Arab ally count some thirty rebel factions in Syria and the largest and most powerful are violent Islamic extremist.

Some US expert counts list more than 70 rebel factions and subgroups, although both sources seem to agree that the most likely group to emerge if the Islamic State ever does break up is Jabhat al-Nusrah – an affiliate of al-Qaeda.

What this means in simple terms is that even if the Islamic State could be “destroyed,” rather than “degraded,” a strategy based on that objective rather than forging a comprehensive strategy and set of partnerships to fight violent religious extremism make no sense even in Syria, much less for a world power — particularly one already fighting other military battles against such movements in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.

At present we have a partial if not a non-strategy even against our declared enemy and no clear strategy for what we once called a “war on terrorism” and one where every metric shows we are not winning.

We not only need to clarify every aspect of what we are really trying to do in Iraq and Syria to fight the Islamic State, we need to go from reporting on global patterns in terrorism and engaging in the struggle of the moment to some clear set of priorities, well defined partnerships with Muslim and other key states, and creating a global strategy that defines clear patterns of action, resources to implement them, and honest metrics for measuring progress — none of which we have done well over a decade after 9/11.

The Non-Strategy for Dealing with Syria

In fairness, many of those who shaped the strategy for dealing with the Islamic State were so focused on Iraq that they almost certainly thought they could decouple the campaign to degrade the Islamic State and drive it out of populated areas in Iraq from any broader goal in Syria for either defeating Assad or creating a meaningful force of moderate rebels.

Given the sharp constraints on the size and use of air power, an advisory and enabling presence on the ground, and the earlier de facto strategic decision to let Syria fester, it made a kind of sense to talk about a token level of new training for Syrian rebels of some 5,000 a year, undefined additional arms and funding, and bypass Syria except for humanitarian relief and better cooperation with key Arab allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

None of this has actually worked out. The United States underestimated the extent to which the Islamic State could exploit humanitarian issues in Syria like the Yazidis and the Kurds. It only seems to have dimly understood what the Islamic State understood all too well: the Erdogan government in Turkey’s focus on destroying Assad and willingness to deal with Sunni Islamic extremists like the Islamic State.

It seems to have forgotten how easy it has often been for outsiders to exploit Kurdish factions, and just how much the very real suffering and discrimination the Kurds face can motivate them.

The end result is a strategic mess.

The Assad forces are using the U.S. and allied campaign against the Islamic state to make a massive step up in air attacks on other rebels with some 200 strikes on October 20th. The Turks have been caught between their own Kurdish problem and the threat to the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, seeking a buffer zone and massive escalation of the U.S. role in Syria against Assad while finding that the Islamic State can use Turkey much more effectively than Turkey can use the Islamic State.

The US air campaign has turned into an unfocused mess as the U.S. has shifted limited air strike resources to focus on Syria and a militarily meaningless and isolated small Syrian Kurdish enclave at Kobani at the expense of supporting Iraqi forces in Anbar and intensifying the air campaign against other Islamic State targets in Syria. As of October 20th, the United States had flown some 310 strikes in more than 2½ months of air activity in Iraq, and 231 in Syria.

It began its strikes in Iraq, however, on August 8th, escalated to major air strikes on the Islamic state and an Al Qaeda element in Syria on September 22nd to October 3rd, and then let the Kurdish crisis in Kobani dominate the air campaign after October 5th.

This, however, is an air campaign that USCENTCOM reports is so small that it rarely totals even 25 strikes a day in both Iraq and Syria against a steadily more disperse Islamic State that can shelter in populated areas and use human shields without reservation. It has flown well under 10 strikes per day on average in both countries, and at best is most effective in striking at exposed combat vehicles visible and isolated enough to make easy targets – albeit under conditions where the strike sortie costs vastly more than the target is hit.

According to a BBC analysis of USCENTCOM data, the strikes hit some 300 combat vehicles through October 8th, but only about 25 were directed against exposed IS fighters. Some 20 more hit refineries, 75 hit firing positions, 35 hit bases and headquarters of all kinds, 35 more hit checkpoints/garrisons/training camps. Issuing daily PR statements about its successes out of the context of its overall impact on both the Islamic State and Iraq serve little to no real purpose.

This does not, however, explain the broader causes of reporting by Rajiv Chandrasekaren in the Washington Post on October 23rd that states that the mission for training moderate Syria rebel forces will be to make the 5,000 additional rebels trained in Saudi Arabia home defense forces for areas already under their control. Really, defense against what — Assad forces, other rebel forces? In isolated enclaves with no clear tactical defense, strategic purpose, or chance of winning control of Syria unless other forces self-destruct?

The point is what? The force that will rescue them if they begin to be overrun is whom?

This relates to the fact that General Dempsey has discussed “considering” a buffer zone in Syria how? It will affect our Arab allies and turkey in what ways? It offers Syria what — if any — prospect of coming out of a humanitarian nightmare that the UN estimates puts some nine million people at risk and freezes or undercuts the nation’s development how? And if this is really a “let Syria rot strategy,” how do we now halt the pattern of escalation we have been in for most of October?

The United States does face many strategic challenges and other priorities, but it needs to make far more firm and explicit decisions about the future strategic role in Syria and tailor its future level of escalation accordingly. It is one thing to work with an Iraqi government and key factions over time with some credible chance of success. It is another to offer false hope and leave the resulting mess to the next president.

The Uncertain Strategy for Dealing with Iraq

The US strategy for dealing with Iraq has already been the third major pillar of the real world campaign against the Islamic State, and — in fact — by far the most important one in U.S. strategy. While it has never been stated as such politically for obvious reasons, ever since Maliki and the cadre around him created an authoritarian mess, provoked a new low level civil war, largely corrupted and destroyed Iraq’s security forces, and then lost most of the Sunni parts of the country to the Islamic State, it has been to push Maliki out.

It has then been to create a meaningful national government, bring the Kurds and Sunnis back into a broad alignment with the central government, and rebuild Iraqi forces so they can win a ground war to retake the country with US air support.

At the same time, it has been to secure Jordan and the Arab Gulf states against the expansion of the Islamic State into an oil exporting region that is vital to the function and stability of the global economy and — as such —- a vital national security interest for the United States.

It has been to rebuild Iraq as an strong independent nation that is a counterbalance to Iran and with solid links to its Arab neighbors, and — to the extent possible — resolve the Iraqi Kurdish issue in ways that give the Kurds security and some form of federation, but still ties them to the central Iraqi government and in ways that keep their close ties to Turkey.

This is a possible set of strategic goals, but it is also an extremely ambitious one. Possible is not probable in every respect although this is an area where the United States has already made some gains. Maliki is gone. There is some hope of a truly national government, and some progress is beginning to be made in strengthening Iraqi army and pesh merga forces.

The new Iraqi government is an awkward mix of Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd, but it at least has enough national unity to agree on a Sunni Minister of Defense and a Shi’ite Minister of the Interior.

The Kurds are participating in the government. Some Sunni politicians are more active in supporting it and a few tribal elements seem to be tilting back towards the government and away from the Islamic State. It is far too early to talk about meaningful success, but it is still major progress over Maliki — a man who ultimately managed to rival Saddam in weakening and dividing his country.

The United States does have some 1,600 to 1,900 personnel on the ground – many of whom are allowed to wear boots. It has helped Iraq establish operational command centers in Baghdad and Irbil, has won acceptance for at least the concept of a Sunni National Guard in the Sunni dominated provinces so the Islamic state can be weakened and driven out, and has pushed the central government to accept the importance of a strong pesh merga even if it does not accept the need to accept Kurdish control of disputed areas and its right to export oil on its own.

At the same time, the United States has clearly not provided the level of air strike support it originally planned and has seen much of the focus on the air campaign shift to a peripheral objective in Kobani.

It has found that the Iraqi military forces are even weaker than it is original assessments indicated, and they indicated that some half of the 50 plus combat brigades in the Iraq forces would need to be disbanded or totally reorganized, and the other half would take a year to several years to build up into fully effective combat units.

Iran still has strong influence over Shi’ite militias largely hostile to the United States, and over key elements of the Iraqi government and security services. It still has some chance of actually exploiting U.S. efforts to build up Iraqi forces by taking advantage of stronger Shi’ite forces and Kurdish buffers against the Sunnis, and its calculation that it will often be on the ground when the United States will be in secure areas in the rear.

It may well feel it can gain from U.S. indecisiveness in Syria and the way it empowers Assad, and it is not clear that the United States has seen that the need for firmness in negotiating over the P5+1 negotiations on Iran’s nuclear programs must be part of a comprehensive strategy for firmness in dealing with Iran’s overall role in the region.

There is no point in demanding the impossible at the political level. The United States cannot force political unity and reform on all the elements of Iraq, and is making what seems to be as an effective effort as it can. There is a need, however, to make it clear to everyone that U.S. support is truly conditional on the Iraqi central government reaching out to the Sunnis, and actually reforming and restructuring its security services.

It is equally necessary to show that U.S. support to both factions is truly conditional on the central government and the Kurds reaching a working set of compromises. The United States cannot afford to be sucked into a political mess of the Iraqis own making, and if they do not move forward, it should make it brutally clear that it will focus on other Arab states and leave them to the consequences.

The United States does, however, need to develop a far more realistic strategy at the military level. The present air campaign is simply too small and unfocused.

The train and equip campaign needs enough forward advisors and boots on the ground to support current Iraqi forces which help in command and coordination and using air power, and help Iraqi ground troops that go through reorganization and re-equipment to become fighting forces. If Iraq seems all too likely to fail at the political level, the US military effort seems too little, too slow, and too limited at the military level.

This highlights the need for transparency in reporting on what is really the key aspect of the “Islamic State War” to the American people, the Congress, the media, and our allies.

If there is any bipartisan lesson we should have learned from the failures in two wars under two administrations from two parties, it is that fighting a war based on spin does not get the honest criticism, effective strategy, and effective conduct of a war that is needed to win.

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

SEE ALSO: These two maps explain ISIS's chokehold over Iraq

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"Classic shoe. Timeless colors." Nike couldn't have said it any better.

The Air Jordan I Retro High OG "Black/White" returns next week and you can expect a majority of sneakerheads and Jordan fans to be gunning for a pair.

Simple and sweet, this iteration of the Jordan I can do no wrong. From the court to the streets, worn with denim or suits, the B/W Air Jordan I is as versatile as they come.

As the hype slowly builds, expect these to be a difficult cop once release day hits.

If you plan on making these your next purchase, circle Saturday, November 8 on your calendars. Rev up your bots. Make friends with shoe store employees. Just expect to go the extra mile if you expect to have these on your feet. Retail is set at $140. 

SEE ALSO: Nike Could Be Missing Out On A Billion-Dollar Opportunity

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About 13.6 million people, equivalent to the population of London, have been displaced by conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and many are without food or shelter as winter starts, the U.N. refugee agency UNHCR said on Tuesday.

Amin Awad, UNHCR's director for the Middle East and North Africa, said the world was becoming numb to the refugees' needs.

"Now when we talk about a million people displaced over two months, or 500,000 overnight, the world is just not responding," he told reporters in Geneva.

The 13.6 million include 7.2 million displaced within Syria - an increase from a long-held U.N. estimate of 6.5 million - as well as 3.3 million Syrian refugees abroad.

In Iraq, 1.9 million have been displaced this year by tribal fighting and the advance of Islamic State, adding to 1 million previously displaced, and 190,000 have left the country to seek safety.

The vast majority of Syrian refugees have gone to Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq or Turkey, which Awad said "are putting us all to shame" with their support for homeless Syrian families.

"Other countries in the world, especially the Europeans and beyond, should open their borders and share the burden."

The U.N. World Food Programme has cut rations for 4.25 million people and lack of funds could force a break in its supplies next month for refugees, spokeswoman Elisabeth Byrs told Reuters.

WFP recently received new pledges that may have averted immediate cuts, Byrs said, although it still needs $325 million to cover its operations for Syria and the region for the rest of 2014.

"Until these pledges are confirmed, WFP's actual funding situation remains dire, with cuts in assistance anticipated during the upcoming winter," she said.

UNHCR says it is short of $58.5 million in donations to prepare 990,000 people for winter, forcing it to prioritise help for people at higher, colder altitudes and for more vulnerable cases, such as newborn babies.

U.N. figures show that leading donors include the European Union, United States, Japan, Norway and some Gulf Arab countries. The data show Russia and China have each provided just 0.1 percent of the total humanitarian funding raised by donors this year for Syria.

Awad said they should do more.

"Politically they cannot really be indifferent, therefore humanitarian (aid) is an imperative and it has to be put first and foremost if there is no (political) settlement ... They need to contribute one way or the other, like the others do," he said.

(Reporting by Tom Miles; Editing by Mark Trevelyan)

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Qatar, with help from the US, is training Syrian rebels at a base in the desert to fight President Bashar Assad's forces and the Islamic State group, Reuters reported Wednesday.

Most of the rebels trained at the camp fight under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army — the largest opposition force in Syria, but some may also be affiliated with extremist organizations that the US has sworn off.

The camp in Qatar lies south of the capital between Saudi Arabia's border and Al Udeid, which is the largest US air base in the Middle East.

Reuters reported that the suspected location of the camp is a closed military zone guarded by Qatari special forces.

According to the report, Qatar has been training rebels from the northern part of the country for nearly a year, but the program has not produced any significant impacts on the battlefield.

The report is the first indication that Qatar is involved in an official train-and-equip program for moderate Syrian rebels.

For years, Qatar has been accused of supporting extremist groups in Syria such as Jabhat al-Nusra, but no concrete evidence has been uncovered.

In spring 2013 the US selected groups of moderate rebels fighting with the Free Syrian Army through a classified CIA-led program. The program allowed for the transfer of U.S.-made weapons to Turkey via other countries’ aircrafts. The weapons were then driven into Syria by truck. The program was partially funded by Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Sunni states. It is unclear if the training camp in Qatar is part of this CIA program.

The U.S. ramped up efforts to support the moderate opposition later in the year and began training several thousand rebels at a secret base in Jordan. Since then, the rebels have failed to make any significant advances in Syria. In fact, they lost Homs, once dubbed the "heart of the revolution," to the regime in May.

That CIA program is merging with one that is going to be facilitated mostly by the U.S. Department of State. But the Department of Defense, Free Syrian Army soldiers told International Business Times, has always been involved in the train-and-equip program. They have worked with the CIA since the program started in 2013, the sources said.

IBTimes reported last week that the US had begun the process of withdrawing its support for rebel groups in northern Syria after they suffered major losses to extremist groups in Idlib province. The Syrian Revolutionaries Front and Harakat Hazm, both of which fight under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army, are two major beneficiaries of the U.S. weapons program in Syria.

Both groups have suffered major losses over the past several weeks in Syria, overrun by Islamist militant groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. Syrian opposition members affiliated with the groups, some of whose spokesmen requested anonymity, said US weapons shipments have stopped.

It is unclear from the Reuters report if the Qatari camp will remain part of the US future effort to train and equip moderate rebels in Syria.

SEE ALSO: Hagel's views on Syria may have just cost him his job

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The Islamic State group (ISIS) has been trying to recruit Israeli Arab doctors and medical students to help out in its field hospitals, which are suffering from a dearth of qualified personnel, Channel 2 reported on Wednesday.

Using social media, the jihadists have been targeting Israeli medical and pharmacy students who are studying in Jordan in an effort to recruit them before they return to Israel to focus on their specialties.

To convince the Israeli Arabs, many of whom come from communities in the north and south of the country, ISIS members would appeal to their Islamic duty to treat injured Muslims by quoting relevant verses from the Koran, the report said.

They would then ask the students to fly to Turkey and from there make their way to the terror group’s bases in Iraq and Syria to apply their skills to wounded fighters.

An unnamed close family relative of one student doctor described how ISIS was attempting to sway the impressionable young students.

“They try to develop a personal connection with them, that they are obligated as Muslims to treat the organization’s wounded who are fighting against [Syrian President Bashar] Assad’s regime,” the source said.

“They give them all kinds of verses from the Koran to drill into them the belief that they are doing the right thing and a great deed, and [say] that they are not required for fighting.”

ISIS has brutally carved out large swaths of Syria and Iraq for its self-declared Islamic caliphate and drawn widespread condemnation for its execution of captives, including some Western hostages.

While in some cases the families of students talk them out of answering the ISIS call for help, the report said, Israeli security services have also intercepted some would-be jihadist medics before they left the country and persuaded them to abandon their plans — or face prison sentences upon their return to Israel.

In October the family of Othman Abdelkayan, from the Bedouin Negev town of Hura, said he was killed in fighting in Syria.

Abdelkayan, an Israeli doctor, left the country in May to join ISIS in Syria. He was slated to do a residency program at Soroka Medical Center in Beersheba in May.

Abdelkayan studied medicine in Jordan, and after he passed the certification test, he was granted a temporary license in Israel.

The Shin Bet internal security service and police believe that more than 30 Israeli Arabs have joined the Islamic State. In October police confirmed that three Arab Israelis had joined the jihadist organization, which has taken control of large swaths of Iraq and Syria.

A bill approved by the Ministerial Committee for Legislation and still making its way through parliament, seeks to crack down on Israeli citizens taking up arms with jihadist groups such as the Islamic State in neighboring Syria and will carry a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment.

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SEE ALSO: A look at Jerusalem like you've never seen before

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As civil war in Syria inches toward its four-year anniversary, the nation’s humanitarian catastrophe deepens.

Some 7.6 million Syrians are now internally displaced, and another 3.3 million have fled to neighboring countries to avoid the complex three-way dogfight among Assad’s forces, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and Syrian rebels.

In Lebanon the influx of one million refugees is straining the capacities of a country of only 4.4 million.

Today, some 12.2 million Syrians, both inside and outside Syria, rely on emergency food aid.

It thus came as a shock when the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) announced on December 1 that a lack of funds was forcing it to suspend aid to help feed and clothe Syrian refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.

In fact, the WFP had been signaling for months that its program for Syria was in dire need of a cash injection from international donors.

Last week, the United States donated $125 million to prop up the program until the end of the year, but it clearly wasn’t enough. The WFP stated that it needed an additional $64 million for December alone to support its system of prepaid voucher cards, which can be used at local stores to buy food and supplies.

Without this lifeline, refugees will face the impending harsh winter without food, warm clothes, or heat. “This couldn’t come at a worse time,” said UN High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres. “I urgently appeal to the international community – support WFP now. Don’t let refugees go hungry.”

The cutback is projected to hit 1.7 million Syrian refugees. Many have signaled that their best option now may be a journey back to war-torn Syria. Unless funds are found quickly, Syria’s “new level of hopelessness” might rise to new heights.

The suspension of WFP aid to Syrian refugees is symptomatic of broader weaknesses in the current multilateral approach to delivering emergency relief. First, because humanitarian assistance is entirely voluntary, it is vulnerable to shifting attitudes in donor nations, particularly aid fatigue.

After years of war and upheaval in the broader Middle East, major international donor governments and their electorates are weary of sending money overseas, particularly given competing domestic demands.

Since 2001, donor nations have devoted hundreds of billions of dollars to humanitarian relief and nation-building in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Libya, and elsewhere. The appetite to continue doing so is dwindling, particularly when—as in the case of Syria—it is clear that such aid is a mere palliative, unaccompanied by either a clear political strategy for a negotiated solution or a military effort to ensure the victory of one side.

As the Syrian war grinds on interminably, there is bound to be dwindling support for providing endless “emergency” relief that only addresses surface symptoms. In other words, public support for addressing the consequences of war is contingent on there being an end in sight.

Second, the current financial burden of providing humanitarian relief is unevenly shared. The United States has been by far the most generous donor government, having contributed approximately $2 billion to the WFP program, about five times as much as the next biggest donor, the United Kingdom. It is past time for other major donors, both established and emerging, to play their part.

Most egregiously, France and China, two of the world’s largest economies, have given less to the WFP than has Ethiopia. The $64 million shortfall that compelled WFP to suspend its program is a “drop in the bucket” for either country. As long as nations like France and China abstain from pulling their weight, other nations will feel justified sitting out.

Third, the humanitarian system is experiencing unprecedented demand on its limited resources. The last time this blog reported on the Syrian refugee crisis, there were three “level-3” emergencies around the world. Today, there are officially four: Syria, Iraq, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic (CAR) — not to mention the Ebola outbreak affecting West Africa.

These simultaneous calamities not only distract attention from Syria, they also divert money. Iraq’s fight against ISIS has displaced approximately 2.1 million Iraqis. The civil war in CAR has led to at least 5,000 deaths and left 2.5 million people in need of humanitarian assistance.

In South Sudan, 1.5 million people have been displaced and more than seven million are at risk of hunger and disease. The Ebola crisis, meanwhile, has claimed approximately 6,000 lives, according to recent reports. These competing crises are taxing the already strained resources of the WPF and other UN agencies. Rigid rules about how institutions can use funds only complicate matters.

As Greg Barrow, spokesman for the WFP’s London office, explains, “Because many donations are allocated to specific programs and cannot be used elsewhere, there is a lack of flexibility in the system.” Although the scale of Syria’s crisis dwarfs the others, the WFP has little authority to reprogram the funds at its disposal.

What can to be done to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, both in Syria and globally? The immediate priority is to provide WFP with the stopgap assistance it needs to resume its voucher program. The current suspension, which exposes already vulnerable populations to intolerable suffering, can be alleviated at modest cost.

The WFP has embarked on a social media campaign in hopes of plugging the hole left by international donors, hoping that the world’s Twitter followers will mobilize action from derelict governments. The United States needs to complement this grassroots effort with high-level diplomatic muscle.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry should press France, China, and other donors to step up to the plate immediately, to ensure that Syrian refugees survive the impending winter—and that nations that are hosting them in large numbers can sustain this burden.

Simultaneously, the Obama administration must redouble its efforts to bring an end to the Syrian civil war — the only sure way to end the country’s humanitarian catastrophe. The administration has sought for some time to thread the needle in Syria, hoping in vain that a robust moderate opposition would emerge that could somehow triumph over both the Assad regime and ISIS jihadists.

This strategy has enjoyed little success. Indeed, the focus on ISIS’ rise has directed US and international attention away from Assad’s atrocities, allowing his campaign against the rebels and the civilian population to remain unchecked. Every airstrike levels buildings, destroys lives, and diminishes any semblance of normality.

Without a political solution, which seems unlikely, Syrians will continue to swell in neighboring countries. External actors have sought to soften the blow on those affected, but their efforts are waning.

Finally, the United States must work with other influential nations to place the global humanitarian enterprise on a firmer institutional and financial foundation. The multilateral response to the Syrian crisis suggests that humanitarian aid has an expiration date, that current voluntary funding mechanisms are inadequate, and that the WFP and existing UN organizations are easily overwhelmed by multiple calamities.

The World Humanitarian Summit, to be convened by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2016, will provide a valuable opportunity for the United States to demonstrate its leadership in helping reform systematic and structural flaws in the current international aid regime.

More immediately, the Obama administration should push for a special session of the UN Security Council to focus global attention on the disastrous security as well as human consequences of the global humanitarian crisis.

SEE ALSO: The chaos in the Middle East is hurting one of America's closest Arab allies

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The diplomatic struggle between Israel and the Palestinians reached a fever pitch on Wednesday as Palestinian ambassadors and their Jordanian allies pressed forward with a copy of a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Council. The resolution, in addition to calling for renewed negotiations, reportedly includes a 2017 deadline for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. 

The Palestinians have been riding a wave of recognition from parliaments in the UK, France, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal, and now even the European Parliament itself. At each step, the Palestinians have cheered on their newfound international allies while Israel has criticized the Europeans for threatening the parameters of the Oslo Accords.

The Palestinians insist their diplomatic initiative is meant to preserve the two-state solution. The Israelis maintain that any unilateral steps threaten the peace process. 

Both are right.

 The Palestinian campaign may be based on the vision of a two-state solution. But in circumventing negotiations with Israel and US mediation in favor of international bodies, the Palestinians risk destabilizing the peace process that started two decades ago at Oslo.

That may be exactly what they want. Ever since the collapse of US-sponsored talks this past April, Palestinian political rhetoric has shifted. No longer are the Palestinians talking about conditions for returning to the negotiating table, but about conditions for halting their diplomatic campaign.

“Palestine 194,” as it is referred to in Ramallah, is the Palestinian campaign to become the 194th full member state of the United Nations. It’s a plan with roots dating back to 2005 but it formally kicked off when the Palestinians threatened to take their case to the UN Security Council in 2011.

That plan was halted by the threat of a US veto. But the Palestinians returned a year later and upgraded their status to non-member observer state at the General Assembly in 2012. This campaign was brought up again before the latest round of talks, when the Palestinians shelved their initiative at Washington’s behest.

Now, after the failure of John Kerry’s 9-month round of negotiations and a devastating war in Gaza that helped shift world opinion against Israel, the Palestinians have fully committed to their campaign to fundamentally change the dynamics of the peace process. As one senior Fatah official professed candidly: “We are looking to replace the US as mediator with the UN.”

This transition may already be taking place.

The US is buckling under the weight of its many failed Middle East policies and the Europeans appear content to fill the void. On Wednesday, the EU parliament voted 498 to 88 in favor of a resolution recognizing Palestinian statehood and the two-state solution, affirming, “these should go hand in hand with the development of peace talks, which should be advanced.”

The EU’s resolution is actually a softer version of resolutions recently passed in various member parliaments, almost all of which have called for recognition of a Palestinian state regardless of negotiations with Israel. 

Also on Wednesday, the High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention adopted a declaration among 126 of the 196 parties to the convention admonishing Israel’s settlement construction and calling on international law to be respected in the West Bank and Gaza. The US, Israel, Canada, and Australia all boycotted the Swiss-sponsored event, but it was otherwise well-attended.

Wednesday was also the day Jordan put forward a draft UN Security Council resolution on behalf of the Palestinians. France is said to be drafting a counterweight to the resolution, and their influence reportedly tempered the Palestinians’ initial draft resolution that was touted in October, revising the deadline for an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank from two years to three, and calling for a 12-month window for finishing comprehensive final-status negotiations.

The draft resolution also reiterated the Palestinians’ commitment to the two-state solution, with a demilitarized Palestinian state along the pre-1967 borders and a capital in East Jerusalem. Palestinians have now changed their tone in calling for an immediate vote on the resolution and say that they will let the draft resolution sit while it is discussed by all members.

Israel, however, views the resolution as imposing a new set of negotiation parameters without their consent. Earlier in the week, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched a diplomatic counter-offensive, meeting US Secretary of State John Kerry and French President Francois Hollande to push back against the resolution.

Netanyahu’s protests are echoed across the political spectrum in Israel and even among his political foes. Tzipi Livni, a long-time negotiator, former minister, and new co-leader of the Labor party, has predicted that the new UN resolution would fail, either by insufficient votes or a US veto. Isaac Herzog, Livni’s Labor co-leader, echoed her sentiments: “Look at the record in the UN Security Council; we have only one real trustworthy ally.”

That the Israeli left finds the Palestinian diplomatic initiative unpalatable underscores the notion among Israelis that Palestine 194 is not helping matters. Though the Palestinians say their efforts are for the sake of preserving the two-state solution, their campaign alienates one of the two principal actors necessary for a comprehensive agreement.

The latest Palestinian gambit doesn’t kill the prospect of peace. But it doesn’t do much to bring a resolution to the conflict any closer.

Grant Rumley is a research analyst at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. 

SEE ALSO: An Iranian proxy still holds all the cards in Lebanon

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Jordan military statement confirms 1 of its planes crashed over Syria, and the pilot was captured by ISIS militants.

On Wednesday, ISIS fighters shot down a warplane believed to be from the US-led coalition over Syria and captured its pilot, activists said.

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the aircraft was shot down near the northern city of Raqqa, Isil's de facto capital. The Observatory said the warplane was part of the US-led coalition, adding that the captured pilot is an Arab.

Another group, the Raqqa Media Center, that covers areas under ISIS control in Raqqa claimed that the pilot is Jordanian.

This is the first warplane shot down by ISIS since the US-led coalition began its air strikes against the group in Syria three months ago.

Raqqa Media Center published a photograph said to be of the pilot who appeared wearing a white shirt as he was surrounded by 11 fighters, some of them masked. Another photograph published by the group showed the man – naked from the waist down and soaking wet – being captured by three gunmen as he was taken out of what appeared to be a lake.

In Washington, a Pentagon official said they are aware about the claims being made over social media that a pilot has been shot down, but they could not confirm the report at this time.

The official said any further questions about the alleged capture should be referred to the government of Jordan. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the reports by name.

The US-led coalition has carried out hundreds of air strikes against ISIS positions in Syria since Sep 23.

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates have joined in air strikes against the extremist group, while Qatar is providing logistical support.

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The Islamic State shot down a Jordanian warplane today as it was conducting operations over the Syrian city of Raqqah, and captured the pilot.

The Islamic State's Raqqah division "identified the pilot as First Lieutenant Mu'adh Yusuf al Kasasbeh," a Jordanian, and published photographs of its fighters capturing him in what appears to be a body of water and then marching him away, according to the SITE Intelligence Group, which obtained the images. The jihadist group also published photographs of the wreckage of the warplane.

The jihadist group said it shot down Kasasbeh's aircraft with an air-aircraft missile as he was flying a mission over Raqqah, the de facto capital of the Islamic State's self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria.

The Jordan Armed Forces confirmed that one of its warplanes was shot down as it was conducting an operation near Raqqah and that one of its pilots was being held "hostage," The Jordan Times reported. Kasasbeh's family confirmed he was being held by the Islamic State.

The Jordanian government claimed that the hostage situation would not impact its involvement in the coalition that has been launching airstrikes against the Islamic State and occasionally the Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda's official branch in Syria.

"The government pledged to continue war on terrorism in defending Islam," the newspaper stated.

The Jordanian aircraft is the first from the Coalition that has been shot down by the Islamic State or other jihadist groups in either Iraq or Syria since the US and its allies began launching airstrikes in Iraq on Aug. 7 and Syria on Sept. 22. Kasasbeh is the first Coalition hostage.

The Islamic State and other jihadist groups such as the Al Nusrah Front and the Muhajireen Army have shot down several Syrian warplanes and military helicopters since the civil war began in the spring of 2011. Additionally, the Islamic State has shot down multiple Iraqi military helicopters in Iraq.

The jihadist groups are flush with shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons after overrunning numerous Syrian and Iraqi military bases and seizing weapons caches that have been left behind.

SEE ALSO: Here's what might be next for ISIS in 2015

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US Central Command released a statement on Wednesday afternoon disputing a claim made by the jihadist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS and ISIL) that they shot down a Jordanian F-16 aircraft earlier in the day. 

"Evidence clearly indicates that ISIL did not down the aircraft as the terrorist organization is claiming," the statement said.

Islamic State fighters in the Syrian city of Raqqah released photos showing a man they identified as a captured Jordanian pilot. The Jordanian Armed Forces, which are part of the international coalition fighting ISIS, confirmed one of its warplanes went down on a mission in the area. 

CENTCOM's statement included a quote from General Lloyd J. Austin III, who is overseeing the American military operations against ISIS. Though Austin confirmed a Jordanian pilot was captured by the group, he suggested the F-16 crashed on its own.

"The Jordanians are highly-respected and valued partners and their pilots and crews have performed exceptionally well over the course of this campaign," Austin said. "We strongly condemn the actions of ISIL which has taken captive the downed pilot.  We will support efforts to ensure his safe recovery, and will not tolerate ISIL's attempts to misrepresent or exploit this unfortunate aircraft crash for their own purposes."

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The father of a Jordanian pilot captured by Islamic State militants in Syria has pleaded for his son's release.

Safi Yousef al-Kaseasbeh, speaking to reporters in the Jordanian capital Amman on Thursday, also urged the militants to show "hospitality" toward his son. He pleaded for good treatment, reminding the militants that his son was a Muslim, the same faith as the ultraconservative group.

The pilot, 1st Lt. Mu'ath al-Kaseasbeh, was captured after his warplane crashed in the militant stronghold of Raqqa on Wednesday while carrying out airstrikes against the militant group.

There has been no word on his fate since his capture. He is the first known military member to be captured from the U.S.-led coalition waging an air campaign against the militant group in Iraq and Syria.

SEE ALSO: ISIS Captured A Jordanian Pilot Flying Over Syria

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Amman (AFP) - Jordan vowed Thursday to make every effort to save a pilot captured by the Islamic State group in Syria as Washington denied claims the jihadists had shot down his warplane.

Maaz al-Kassasbeh, a 26-year-old first lieutenant in the Jordanian air force, was captured by IS on Wednesday after his F-16 jet crashed while on a mission against the jihadists over northern Syria.

It was the first warplane lost and the first capture of a serviceman since the coalition launched strikes against IS in Syria in September.

It was also a major propaganda victory for the Sunni extremist group, which released photographs parading the captured pilot.

"The Jordanian government... is making all efforts with several crisis cells to free (the pilot)," government daily Al-Rai said.

"We are confident that our brave one will be released... He has not been forgotten."

Jordan, along with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, has joined the US-led coalition carrying out air strikes against IS after it seized control of large parts of Syria and Iraq.

Kassasbeh's plane went down near the city of Raqa, which IS has used as its de facto capital and where coalition warplanes have carried out regular strikes.

The jihadists and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said the plane was downed by an anti-aircraft missile, raising concerns for other coalition aircraft.

But the US military said "evidence clearly suggests that ISIL did not down the aircraft", using another name for IS, without giving a cause for the "crash".

"We strongly condemn the actions of ISIL, which has taken captive the downed pilot," said Central Command chief General Lloyd Austin.

"We will support efforts to ensure his safe recovery, and will not tolerate ISIL's attempts to misrepresent or exploit this unfortunate aircraft crash for their own purposes."

Jordan's parliament said it would hold IS "responsible for safeguarding the life" of Kassasbeh, describing him as a "hero".

- Father's 'mercy' plea - 

IS posted pictures online showing its fighters holding the pilot.

One showed a man being carried from a body of water by gunmen. Another showed the same man on land, surrounded by almost a dozen militants.

The pilot's father was quoted by Jordanian media as saying the family had been informed by the air force of his capture.

He called on IS to show "mercy" on his son, who just married in July, and to release him.

Messages of support for the pilot flooded Facebook and Twitter under the hashtag "We are all Maaz al-Kassasbeh".

Analyst Mohamed Abu Rummaneh, from the University of Jordan, said he did not expect Amman to reconsider its role in the anti-IS coalition.

"A large majority of Jordanians -- nearly 90 percent according to polls -- consider Daesh (another name for IS) to be an enemy," he said.

But political commentator Labib al-Kamhawi said the government would come under pressure to pull out of the coalition "if, God forbid, anything adverse happened to the pilot".

An activist in Raqa said IS militants were divided over the pilot's fate, with more extremist foreign fighters wanting him executed and others wanting him kept alive.

Jordanian Salafist leader Mohammed Shalabi denounced Amman's participation in the coalition, and warned the war on IS would lead to "deaths and injuries". 

UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon appealed for the pilot's captors to treat him "in accordance with international humanitarian laws".

- Strikes continue -

Despite the loss of the plane, the coalition carried out more strikes against IS targets, said the Observatory, which relies on a network of sources for its reports on Syria.

The monitor said four strikes were carried out late Wednesday against IS positions in Kobane, where Syrian Kurdish fighters have been holding off an IS offensive.

Other strikes hit Bukamal near the Iraqi border.

Elsewhere in Syria, at least 44 IS fighters were killed in clashes with Kurdish militia in the northeastern province of Hasakeh and in Kobane, said the Observatory.

Syria's conflict began in 2011 as a peaceful revolt against President Bashar al-Assad but evolved into a multi-front civil war that saw IS grab large swathes of land.

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The Islamic State says it has executed Moaz al-Kasasbeh, a Jordanian pilot whom the group captured in Syria in December.

The group released a video in which Kasasbe is burned alive.

The Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, had been attempting to trade Kasasbeh for Sajida al-Rishawi, a would-be suicide bomber imprisoned in Jordan, since 2005.

Jordanian state TV confirmed Kasasbe's death and reported that he had been killed Jan. 3. This explains why ISIS was unable to produce proof the pilot was still alive while the sides were supposedly working toward a potential prisoner exchange — and also proves the jihadist group was negotiating in bad faith.

Public opinion in the kingdom is already split over Jordan's participation in the anti-ISIS coalition. As David Schenker of the Washington Institute for Near East policy wrote on Dec. 5, only 62% of Jordanians considered ISIS a terrorist group, while many question whether there was a real national interest in getting involved in the wars in Syria and Iraq.

Jordan had already halted airstrikes against the group after Kasasbe's capture, and this latest development could potentially jeopardize Jordanian involvement in the fight against the jihadist group. On the other hand, the brutal incident could also hurt ISIS' efforts to recruit in the country.

Not only is ISIS barbaric, it is a stupid organization as well. Burning al-Kasasba alive will destroy any foothold gained in Jordan.

— Michael Koplow (@mkoplow) February 3, 2015

Kasasbe's death comes just days after ISIS released a video showing the beheading of Kenji Goto, a Japanese journalist. As The New York Times reported after Goto's death, ISIS now has as few as four international hostages left, down from a high of 23, and it failed to secure either a $200 million ransom or the release of prisoners held in Jordan — its stated objectives in its requests to ransom Kasasbe and Goto. 

While Kasasbe's gruesome death keeps the group in the global spotlight and could galvanize opinion within an Arab member state of the anti-ISIS coalition, it could also be read as a sign that ISIS is increasingly impulsive and nonstrategic. The group has also experienced a series of recent battlefield setbacks, most notably the breaking of its siege on the border town of Kobane in northern Syria. 

In an email to journalists, the National Security Council said it was "aware of the video purporting to show that Jordanian 1st Lieutenant Moaz al-Kasasbeh has been murdered by the terrorist group ISIL. The intelligence community is working to confirm its authenticity." 

SEE ALSO: What it's like trying to leave ISIS

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Jordan has executed two Iraqi militants in response to ISIS killing a captured Jordanian pilot with fire.

Sajida al-Rishawi, the Iraqi woman militant, was sentenced to death for her role in a 2005 suicide bomb attack that killed 60 people. Ziyad Karboli, an Iraqi al Qaeda operative, who was convicted in 2008 for killing a Jordanian, was also executed according to the New York Times.

Jordanian defense officials had promised retribution.

According to Amman-based AFP journalist Randa Habib an army spokesperson promised that Jordan's response will "be at the level of disaster." Conflict News reported that an army spokesperson said that the country's "revenge will be of the size of the anger of the Jordanian people," which is apparently considerable: after news of Kasasbe's death broke, Habib reported a general mood of "anger, disgust" and "calls for revenge."

It's not surprising that the Jordanian monarchy would want to channel outrage over Kasasbe's death into more assertive anti-ISIS policies. According to the Soufan Group, nearly 2,100 Jordanians have traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State. Jordan shares borders with both countries and hosts over 747,000 refugees from the conflict in Syria.

The country has remained remarkably stable in spite of having deep national fissures of its own, with a royal family identified with the country's Bedouin minority ruling over a majority-Palestinian population.

But Jordan's options may be limited. The country had grounded its pilots after Kasasbe's capture and was thought to mostly play an intelligence-gathering role when it joined Operation Inherent Resolve.

With public opinion inside the kingdom split over cooperation in the anti-ISIS coalition and the kingdom beset with internal concerns, executing terrorism-related prisoners may be the monarchy's most expedient way of sating popular anger and getting back at the group while also papering over its lack of other options for the time being.

SEE ALSO: Why young western women are being drawn to ISIS

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This week's news and images of ISIS burning Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbeh to death in a cage comes just days after the group decapitated a second Japanese hostage.

Such horrific murders provoke, shock, and dismay, which is their goal.

By combining medieval brutality with twenty-first century social media, ISIS seeks the largest possible amount of attention for itself and its distorted variant of religio-messianism.

Such incidents require a more vigorous military, as well as messaging, response. The United States can intensify the role it has been playing in leading the coalition. But it is incumbent on senior religious figures indigenous to the Muslim world to counter ISIS’ narrative.

Holding Kasasbeh hostage had helped provoke a limited backlash against Jordan’s participation in the US-led coalition against ISIS.

Prior to the news of his murder, some of Kasasbeh’s Bararsheh tribesmen protested in Amman against King Abdullah and his decision to participate in the anti-ISIS campaign.

Such demonstrations, particularly amongst tribesmen, are unusual in Jordan.

In its barbaric killing of Kasasbeh, ISIS hopes to drive an even greater wedge between Jordan’s Hashemite rulers and the small but not insignificant number of Jordanians sympathetic to ISIS or at least opposed to Jordan’s fight against it. With Jordan now hosting over half a million Syrian refugees, there is considerable unease and conflict fatigue in the Hashemite kingdom.

Employing their media savvy, ISIS released the images of Kasasbeh’s murder the same day as King Abdullah’s visit to Washington, even though the Jordanian pilot had apparently been murdered a month ago, according to sources in Amman.

ISIS no doubt wanted to drive home the image of the Western-backed Abdullah being received in the capital of the coalition’s leader.

Not wanting to play into this narrative, King Abdullah immediately cut short his visit to return back home. Upon return, he will likely rally the vast majority of Jordanians outraged by the murder of their pilot and take strong measures against incarcerated accused terrorists.

ISIS knows and expects that. But ISIS nonetheless hopes its defiant gruesome murder of Jordan’s pilot, like the beheadings of other ISIS prisoners, will make some Jordanians question their country’s military support of the US-led coalition and suggest that its participation is not worth the cost.

ISIS calculates that provoking anguish and anger amongst its enemies will help generate new friends and recruits, or at least weaken the resolve of its adversaries. King Abdullah will doubtlessly try to prove this notion mistaken.

ISIS is seeking to project an image of itself as fierce. Such tactics could successfully distract attention from the significant battlefield setback that ISIS has just suffered at the hands of Kurdish fighters in Kobani and elsewhere.

Yet ISIS’ projections of fierceness are not just a contrivance. ISIS’ capture and control of Mosul and large chunks of Syrian and Iraqi territory last June demonstrate the very real military power at its disposal. But it adds, as an ideological force multiplier, its brand of Islamist ideology.

That ISIS poses an ideological threat well beyond the battlefield suggests that the US-led coalition’s reliance largely on air-power is too limited. Sure, determined Kurdish fighters were successful in countering ISIS on the ground in Kobani with coalition support. But only after a protracted and deadly fight.

Similar fighters prepared to challenge ISIS on the ground in Iraq and Syria appear sorely lacking. But the ugly murder of Moaz al-Kasasbeh demonstrates that the anti-ISIS coalition needs a robust strategy to battle the Islamist forces on the ideological as well as the military battlefield.

SEE ALSO: How ISIS abuses humanitarian aid

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BEIRUT, Lebanon — The killing of hostage Maaz al-Kassasbeh by the Islamic State was different from others that came before it, but the motivation was the same.

A video released on Tuesday appears to show the Jordanian fighter pilot being burned alive in a locked cage by the group’s fighters. The cameraman zooms in to show his last seconds.

There is a reason that al-Kasaesbeh was killed in such a theatrical and sadistic manner.

It’s comforting to tell ourselves, in the face of such brutality, that the Islamic State (IS) is becoming weaker. It also happens to be true.

The US-led anti-IS coalition, of which Jordan is a member state, has played a key role in halting the group's advance, and helped various forces on the ground win back lost territory.

Over the past few months, IS has suffered a series of defeats on the battlefields of Iraq and Syria — in Sinjar, Diyala province and, in front of television cameras from around the world, in Kobani.

These defeats, however insignificant they may seem strategically, carry with them a loss of prestige — an invaluable resource for IS in building support and in the recruitment of fighters from abroad.

With some imagination, it is possible to understand why some misguided soul might want to join a burgeoning Islamic State that is powerful, confident and expanding. But as the defeats mount, it becomes harder for IS propagandists to convince others that they are carrying out God’s work.

The nature of al-Kasaesbeh’s killing should be viewed in the context of these defeats — as a form of damage control, an attempt to repair its reputation for strength. The same was true when IS announced it had killed American aid worker Peter Kassig in November. 

In this case, it seems the greater the defeat, the stronger the need to reassert itself. The cage, the orange jumpsuit, the masked gunmen standing on raised platforms like props on a film set, the killing by fire and other theatrics show that the Islamic State is having to work harder to instil fear.

Reports suggests that IS killed al-Kasaesbeh a month ago, but held back the video and even entered into negotiations with Jordan in an apparent attempt to release an IS prisoner. That supports the theory that the group thought carefully about how it could have maximum impact.

This is a group, after all, that profits from the weakness that its barbarism provokes in others — fear, anger and the desire for revenge.

So did it work?

It's likely that at least part of the reason why al-Kasaesbeh was shown to have been killed in such a brutal way was to scare Jordanians into opposing their country’s involvement in the war against IS.

Early indications appear to show that it had the opposite effect.

Speaking before his son’s death, Saif al-Kasaesbeh had questioned the wisdom of Jordan’s participation in the war. But reached by Buzzfeed on Wednesday, he said it was his country’s duty “to destroy this terrorist group.” The same sentiment is being expressed by many other Jordanians.

It is worth keeping in mind, however, that although very public killing of hostages has become the Islamic State’s main source of propaganda — a way to fix the world’s attention — it has other tools at its disposal for attracting recruits.

The use of barrel bombs by President Bashar al-Assad’s forces is one example of violence IS has leveraged to justify their own brutality. The indiscriminate weapon is described by Human Rights Watch’s Kenneth Roth as “the principal tool being used to slaughter civilians” in Syria today.

The Islamic State is by no means beaten. And the group's supporters will no doubt celebrate the killing as a powerful strike against the anti-IS coalition.  

But it was not too long ago that the world was shocked by the group’s military victories, rather than the attention-grabbing barbarism that we see today.

SEE ALSO: ISIS executed a captured Jordanian pilot by burning him alive

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Jordan's military has promised an "earth-shattering" response against the Islamic State after the group released a video in which Jordanian pilot Moaz al-Kasasbe was burned alive. 

There are already unconfirmed reports that Jordan has carried out airstrikes against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL, in Mosul. Beyond airstrikes, Jordan could further contribute to the fight against ISIS through the use of its extremely effective special forces units. 

Jordan's special forces team, grouped under Jordan's Joint Special Operations Command, is 14,000 strong and is one of the most effective fighting and intelligence forces in the region. Jordanian special forces frequently train alongside US forces.

Meanwhile, Jordan is a global center for special forces training operations. Jordan's King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC) is the centerpiece of the country's Special Operations capabilities and is routinely used by other countries.

The facility, which includes training like simulated airline hijackings and close-quarter fighting in addition to K9 integration exercises, also hosts the annual Special Operations Forces Exhibition and Conference.

This focus reflects ruler King Abdullah II's past assignment within the nation's special forces and his certification as a Cobra pilot. In 1996, with US help, Abdullah began the reorganization of the country's special forces into a more modern force.  

Formed in 1963, the Jordanian special forces have been trained to conduct reconnaissance, combat, and counterterrorism operations. 

One of the Jordanian special forces' chief duties is guarding Jordan's national borders. This mission took on increased importance following mounting instability in Iraq after 2006.  

The potential for violent spillover from Iraq and Syria has caused the special forces to put increased emphasis on counterterrorism operations. Here, service members conduct a mock anti-hijacking operation.   

Jordanian forces have also trained alongside the US for anti-hijacking missions. 

Most of Jordan is a dry desert, but the special forces train in all manner of environments. Here, special forces train to carry out a water-borne assault.

Jordan's special forces have also benefited from actual combat experience, including multiple deployments to Afghanistan.

Aside from military capabilities, Jordanian special forces have proved adept at intelligence gathering. Internal instability and terrorism have turned into major concerns for the Jordanian monarchy.

SEE ALSO: The most powerful militaries in the Middle East [ranked]

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BRISBANE, Australia (Reuters) - Peter Greste, the Al Jazeera journalist freed after more than a year in an Egyptian prison, arrived back in his Australian homeland on Thursday and called for the release of two colleagues still in custody.

Greste was released on Sunday after 400 days in a Cairo jail and had been in Cyprus since. He had been sentenced to seven years on charges that included aiding a terrorist group in a case that had attracted widespread attention and criticism of Egypt's leadership and judiciary.

"I can't tell you how ecstatic I am to be here. This is a moment that I've rehearsed in my mind at least 400 times over the past well, 400 days," said Greste after embracing well-wishers on his arrival in Brisbane.

Greste's colleagues, Canadian-Egyptian Mohamed Fahmy and Egyptian national Baher Mohamed, remain in prison. They were jailed for between seven and 10 years on charges including spreading lies to help a terrorist organization - a reference to the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.

Egyptian security officials have said Fahmy could be released soon and deported to Canada.

"If it's right for me to be free then it's right for all of us ... I think that Egypt now has an opportunity to show that justice doesn't depend on your nationality," Greste said.

Greste said later on Thursday he would continue to campaign for the release of his two colleagues, whom he described as brothers. He also said he wanted to return to journalism after spending time with his family.

"I was really given an opportunity to look back at my life again too, look back at the screw-ups I have made, to appreciate all ... the amazing things I've done and experienced in ways that I never really understood in the past," Greste told a news conference.

Egyptian authorities accuse Qatar-based Al Jazeera of being a mouthpiece of the Muslim Brotherhood, the movement the army removed from power in 2013. Al Jazeera denies the allegations.

The journalists say they were doing their jobs when detained. Their imprisonment reinforced the view of human rights groups that the government was rolling back freedoms gained after the 2011 uprising that toppled autocrat Hosni Mubarak.

They were detained in December 2013 and charged with helping a terrorist group by broadcasting lies that harmed national security.

Baher Mohamed was given an extra three years for possessing a single bullet. If the authorities decide to free him, resolving his case could be more complex because he does not possess a foreign passport.

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CAIRO (AP) -- The horrific fate of a captured Jordanian pilot, burned to death by the Islamic State group, unleashed a wave of grief and rage on Wednesday across the Middle East, a region long riven by upheavals and violence. Political and religious leaders united in outrage and condemnation, saying the slaying of the airman goes against Islam's teachings.

The gruesome militant video of the last moments in the life of 26-year-old Lt. Muath Al-Kaseasbeh, whose F-16 crashed in Syria in December during a U.S.-led coalition raid on the extremist group, crossed a line - beyond the beheadings of Western hostages at the hands of Islamic State extremists.

From the world's most prestigious seat of Sunni Islam learning, Cairo's Al-Azhar Mosque, Grand Imam Ahmed al-Tayeb said the IS militants deserve the Quranic punishment of death, crucifixion or the chopping off of their arms for being enemies of God and the Prophet Muhammad.

"Islam prohibits the taking of an innocent life," al-Tayeb said. By burning the pilot to death, he added, the militants violated Islam's prohibition on the immolation or mutilation of bodies - even during wartime.

Under many Mideast legal systems, capital punishment is usually carried out by hanging. In Iran and Pakistan, stoning to death as punishment for adultery exists in the penal code but is rarely used. Beheadings are routinely carried out in Saudi Arabia, and Gaza's militant Hamas rulers have on occasion publicly shot to death Palestinians suspected of spying for Israel.

But burning to death as a punishment proscribed by an Islamic court - such as the self-styled tribunals set up by the Islamic State militants in areas under their control - is unheard of in the contemporary Middle East. The IS extremists captured a third of both Iraq and Syria in a blitz last year, proclaimed their caliphate and imposed their harsh interpretation of Islamic law.

In Saudi Arabia, prominent cleric Sheik Salman al-Oudah cited on Wednesday a saying attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, which reserves for God alone the right to punish by fire.

In Qatar, cleric Youssef al-Qaradawi - respected by the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists - issued a five-page statement listing Quranic verses and sayings, also attributed to the prophet and telling Muslims to not mistreat prisoners of war.

But al-Qaradawi tempered his admonishment of the immolation death of the Jordanian pilot by criticizing the international community's "laxity" toward Syrian President Bashar Assad, saying such an attitude "created these extremist groups and provided them with a fertile environment."

In Algeria, cleric El-Hadi Shalaby noted that the majority of Islamic State group's victims have been Muslims, both Sunnis and Shiites.

"What hurts me as a Muslim is that they (IS militants) do all this in the name of Islam," he said. "The Muslim faith is utterly foreign to these practices." 

However, some sought to justify the Islamic State's killing of the pilot.

Hussein Bin Mahmoud, an Islamic State-linked theologian, claimed on one of the group's social media forums that two of the Prophet Muhammad's revered successors ordered punishment by fire for renegades shortly after the Prophet's death. Al-Azhar has long disputed this claim.

Bin Mahmoud also cited a Quranic verse that requires Muslims to punish their enemies in kind. Since U.S.-led airstrikes "burn" Muslims, he argued, the IS group must burn those behind the raids.

But that view has only been embraced by a radical fringe, and mainstream Muslims united in condemnation of the killing on Wednesday.

Iyad Madani, the leader of the 57-nation, Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Cooperation - the world's largest bloc of Muslim countries - said the killing showed total disregard for the rights of prisoners under Islam, as well as what he called the moral standards for war.

There is a "malaise" in parts of the Middle East, along with the "intellectual decay, the political fragmentation and the abuse of Islam, the great religion of mercy," he said.

U.S.-allied Gulf Arab nations issued similar condemnations.

United Arab Emirates' foreign minister, Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, reaffirmed his nation's commitment to fighting terrorism and extremism. "This heinous and obscene act represents a brutal escalation by the terrorist group, whose evil objectives have become apparent," he said.

The UAE is one of the most visible Arab members in the U.S.-led coalition battling the Islamic State group, which also includes Jordan.

Bahrain, a Gulf state that is home to the U.S. 5th Fleet, denounced the killing as "despicable," and Kuwait's emir, Sheikh Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, blasted the killing as "criminal" and "vicious."

Qatar's Foreign Ministry also condemned the "criminal act." The tiny but very rich Gulf nation hosts the regional command center coordinating coalition airstrikes.

In predominantly Muslim Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called the killing an act of "savagery," adding that "there is no such thing in our religion."

Iran, which has aided both Iraq and Syria against the IS, said the killing of the pilot was an "inhuman" act that violated the codes of Islam, according to Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marziyeh Afkham.

Tunisia's Foreign Ministry decried the "cowardly" and "savage" act. The newly elected President Beji Caid Essebsi said the pilot's slaying was an "odious crime" incompatible with the principles of Islam and all other divine laws.

In his native Jordan, the killing of al-Kaseasbeh - who had been the subject of intense negotiations over a possible swap with an al-Qaida prisoner on death row - drew swift retribution.

The prisoner, an Iraqi woman convicted of involvement in a triple hotel bombing in Amman in 2005, was executed along with another al-Qaida prisoner at dawn on Wednesday.

The pan-Arab al-Hayat newspaper denounced the pilot's killing with a one-word headline on the front page: "Barbarity."

"How many ... are there, whose names we are ignorant of, slaughtered by the Islamic State and their brothers?" asked an article in Lebanon's left-leaning daily Assafir.

Jordanian politician Mohammed al-Rousan wept openly on national television as he described watching al-Kaseasbeh's death, saying even people accustomed to violence could not bear to see a man burned alive.

Then, his tears turned to rage.

"Let's use the same methods as them!" he shouted during the interview with Lebanon's al-Mayadeen TV. "Let's kill their children! Let's kill their women!"

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